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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Defendant in Error. 
PETJ7riON FOR WRIT OF ERROR AND 
SUPERSEDEAS. 
To the. Honorable Jtttclges of the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
· Your petitioner, Lewis Merritt, respectfully represents 
that on the 23d day of l\iay, 1934, he was convicted in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, Virginia, on a charge 
of attempting to commit the crime of murder, and final judg-
ment rendered against him in sentencing him to confinement 
in the penitentiary for a term of eight years. A transcript 
of the record and of the final judgment thereon is herewith 
exhibited and prayed to be read and treated as a part of 
this petition. 
Your petitioner is advised and represents that the said 
final judgement is erroneous and he files this, his petition, 
for a writ of error from and supersedeas to, the said final 
judgment, as aforesaid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Your petitioner, who was the defendant in the hereinafter 
mentioned indictment, was indicted by the grand jury of the: 
Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, Virginia, at its April 
2 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
1934 term. The indictment charging the defendant with at-
. · tempting to commit the crime of murder by feloniously, will-
fully and of his malice aforethought pointing a loaded pitJtol 
at one, P. H. TrUll, and in that manner and form did at-
tempt to kill and murder the said P. H. Trull. 
At the direction of the trial court the Attorney for the 
Commonwealth filed a bill of particulars stating that the 
Commonwealth expected to prove that the defendant did on 
the 25th day of March, 1934, have in his possession a pistol, 
and that the defendant did discharge and shoot off the said 
pistol against and at the said P. H. Trull, with intent to 
attempt to commit murder. (R., p. 1 and 2.) 
lThe defendant was in a beer saloon in Hopewell on Sun-
day night, March 24th. About 11 :00 P. 1\L an argument 
arose between a soldier named 1\foore and one of a crowd of 
young· men who worked on a dredge in James River. The 
proprietress of the saloon ordered the whole company of 
about fifteen or twenty persons out in the street. The de-
fendant went outside with the others. He had had no quar-
rel with anyone, and had not spoken t.o or been spoken to by 
P. H. Trull, 'vhon1 he is charged with attempting to murder. 
Mter reaching the street, the defendant was knocked down 
by Trull, and while the defendant was lying on the ground 
and Trull and others standing over him and around him, 
some one fired a pistol in the air. The witness, P. H. Trull, 
claiming the pistol was fired by the defendant, Lewis Mer-
ritt, at him, P. H. 'Trull, and that the bullet passed through 
the rim of his hat. Trull ran away when the pistol was 
fired. There was only one shot fired. 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. 
1. The trial court erred in overruling the demurrer, and 
the (lefendant excepted. {R., p. 3.) 
2. The trial court erred in overruling the defendant's mo-
tion to reject the bill of particulars to which ruling the de-
fendant excepted. (R., pp. 3 and 4.) 
3. The trial court erred in overruling the motion to. set 
the verdict aside, and grant the defendant a new trial on the 
ground that the verdict was contrary to the law and evi-
dence in the case, and without evidence to support the same,. 
to which ruling the defendant excepted. (R., p. 6.) J • 
FIRST .ASSIGNJJfENT OF ERROR. The trial court 
erred in overruling the defendant's demurrer to the indict-
ment. The indictment charges only that Lewis Merritt, the , 
defendant, attempted to commit the crime of 1nurder by fe:. 
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loniously, willfully and of his 1nalice aforethqught pointing 
a loaded pistol at P. H. Trull, he, Merritt, then being close 
enough to the said Trull to be in carrying distance of the 
said pistol, and in the manner and form above set forth, did 
attempt to kill and murder the said P. H. Trull. 
''It is an elementary rule of criminal pleading· that an 
indictment for an attempt to commit an offense must al-
lege some act done by the defendant of such a nature as to 
constitute an attempt, in a legal sense, to commit the con-
templated offense, otherwise the indictment will not be suffi-
cient." Hicks v. Cont., 86 Va. 226. 
Cunningham v. Co1n., 88 Va. 39; Clark's Case, 47 Va. (6 
Gratt.) 675. 
1 Whart. Crim. Law (9th edition), sec. 192. Using the 
language of the court in Hicks v. Com., 86 Va. at page 226-
227: 
''An attempt to commit a crime is compounded of two ele-
ments: (1) The intent to commit it; and (2) a direct, in-
effectual act done towards its commission. Code, sec. 3888, 
2 Bishop Crim. Prac., sec. 71. Or, as Wharton defines it, 
''an attempt is an intended apparent unfinished crime.'' 
Therefore, the act must reach far enough towards the ac-
complishment of the desired result to amount to the com-
mencement of the consummation. It must not be merely 
preparatory. In other 'vords, while it need not be the last 
proximate act to the consummation of the offence attempted 
to be perpetrated, it must approach sufficiently near to it 
to stand ~ither as the first or smne subsequent step in a di-
rect movement towards the commission of the offence after 
the· preparations are made. Uhl 's case, 6 Gratt. 706; JJfc-
Dade v. People·, 29 1Yfich. 50. 
In Clark's case, 47 ·va. (6 Gratt.) quoting Frye, J., in Oo1n-
monwealth v. Isarel, 31 Va. ( 4 Leigh) 675, the court says: 
''The plea of not g·uilty only puts in issue the allegations 
of the indictment, and the con1monwealth is only required 
to prove the matters alleged.'' 
We may go even further and say that as a matter of crimi-
nal pleading the commonwealth is entitled to prove only 
such matters as are alleged in the indictment. Should the 
defendant in this case have admitted doing every act in the 
manner alleged in the indictment he could not have been le-
gally sentenced for attempting to commit murder. While 
the indictment charges that he feloniously attempted to com-. 
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mit murder, such is only the conclusion of the pleader. The 
indictment must allege intent, since intent is one of the ele-
ments of an atte1npt to commit a crime. The defendant calls 
to the consideration of the Court the fact that this indictment 
totally fails to allege any intent to do Trull or any other 
person any bodily harm whatsoever. While intent is im-
plied from allegations in the indictment of any overt act to-
wards the attempt indicating a felonious intent, such as an 
assault. Ounningharn v. Co·m·monwealth, 88 Va. 39; Uhl v. 
Com., 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 706; Broadd'lts v. Com., 126 Va. 733. 
The latter case treats this question at some length and clearly 
approves the rule of pleading enunciated by Mr. Bishop, 
1 Bish. New Cr. Procedure (4th edition) and quoted in the 
opinion of the learned Judg·e as follows: 
''The evil intent, being· an element in every crime~ must 
always be in son1e way alleged.· But when in the nature of 
the individual case it is a part of the acts alleged, it need not 
be separately stated.'' Can it be claimed that the mere al-
legation in the indictn1ent in this case that the defendant 
pointed a loaded pistol at the witness unaccompanied by any 
threat and not attended by any circumstance showing a fe-
lonious intent, is an in1pliecl allegation of such intent 1 
In Field.r; v. Cont. 129 \Ta. 774, the court approved an in-
dictment somewhat similar to the one here. But in the in-
dictment in Fields v. Co'mmonwealth the allegation was made 
that the accused "did feloniously attempt to commit the crime 
of murder, by then and there, with a pistol loaded * * • fe-
loniously, willfully and of her malice aforethought, did dis-
charge and shoot off, at and towards one David Tabb • • .., ' ' 
Following the rule enunciated in the above cited c~ses the 
court held than an assault had been properly charged, and 
intent was implied from the charge of felonious assault. 
At the direction of the trial court and request of defendant 
the Commonwealth filed a bill of particulars stating thereiu 
that it expected to prove that the defendant did "have in his 
possession a pistol,'' and that he ''did discharge and shoot 
off the said pistol against a.nd at the said P. H. Trull, with in-
tent to atte·mp.t to commit n1urder." . 
The defendant here contends that a defective indictment, 
such defect as in this case, being the omission of an essential 
allegation, can not be cured by a bill of particulars. P·ine ~ 
Scott v. Com., 121 Va. 812. 
In "Wilkerson v. Co1n., 122 Va. at page 922, the court said: 
"A bill of particulars may supply the fault of generality or 
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But can it be said that the bill of particulars here, even 
tries to supply the necessary averment in the indictment of 
intent? 
The bill of particulars fails to say that the· defendant in..: 
tended to kill P. I-I. Trull, or any other person, or that the 
defendant intended to shoot P. H. Trull, or any other per-
son. But upon the other hand, the bill of particulars specifi-
cally avers the ''intent to attempt to commit murder." Which 
averment is only a conclusion of the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney. Certainly it can not be said that "murder" and "at-
tempt to commit murder" are not separate and distinct 
crimes, punishable under the statute with different penalties. 
We are, therefore, confronted 'vith the following conditions . 
. The indictment. totally fails to charge intent, either in direct 
tern1s or by averments of fact implying intent to kill any one 
or to commit any felony, yet alleging the conclusion that the 
defendant ''attempted to commit murder.'' While the bill of 
particulars inferentially denies the allegation of the Common-
'vealth Attorney's conclusion, by expressly averring that the 
defendant's intention was only to ''attempt to commit mur: 
der." For the above set forth reasons the defendant says. 
the trial court erred in overruling his demurred to the in"7 · 
dictment. ' 
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. The trial court 
erred in overruling the defendant's motion to reject the bill 
of particulars filed by the Commonwealth. 
The defendant is brought into court to answer the charge 
of '~Feloniously attempt to commit the crime of murder'' by 
pointing a loaded pistol at P. H. Trull, he (the defendant) 
being close enough to Trull ''to be within carrying distance· 
of said pistol.'' (R., p. 1.) The defendant demurred to the 
indictment for reasons set forth in the first assig·nment of 
error, and when his den1urrer was overruled by the trial court, 
he moved that the Commonwealth furnish him with a bill of 
particulars. The motion was granted and the Coll)monwea.lth 
filed a bill of particulars with two paragraphs. tThe first para-
graph stating that is expected to show that the defendant on· 
the date charged in the indictment, had in his possession a 
pistol. The second paragraph stating that the defendant 
''discharged and shot off the said pistol at and against the 
said P. H. 'rrull, with intent to _attemp.t to commit murder." 
The learned Judge of the trial court, in a ten page opinion; 
made a part of the record in this case by order of the court, ap.l 
pears to take the position that the bill of particulars reme-
. dies such defects as appear in the indictment and supplies 
such essential omissions therein. 
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In Webster v. Co1n., 141 Va. a~ page 592, this court said: 
''The bill of particulars furnished by the prosecuting attor-
ney limited the offense,c; for which he would prosecute to the 
causes stated in his bill of particulars, and was in effect an 
abandonment of any prosecution under counts 2 and 3.'' 
. See also Mitchell v. Com., 141 Va. 541; Hudgins v. Com., 142 
Va. 628. 
In Riner v. Com., 145 Va. 908, the court said: 
''The attempt to amend the indictment by the bill of par-
ticulars was error, as the bill of particulars stated an offense 
not embraced in the indictment.'' 
. THIRD .ASSIGNMENI,T OF ERROR. The trial court 
~rred in overruling the motion of the defendant to set the 
verdict of the jury aside and grant him a new trial on the 
grounds that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evi-
dence in the case, and without evidence to support it. The 
evidence of the witness Trull and his friends who worked on 
'the dredge boat with him, and the evidence of the wituesses 
·for the defendant was directly opposed to each other so far as. 
the shooting ·was concerned. The la'v is so well settled in 
regard to the verdict when based on conflicting evidence that 
your petitioner will confine himself to the testimony of the 
Commonwealth's witnesses. 
The defendant was indicted and prosecuted under section 
4767 Va. Code as amended Acts 1930 page 30, which reads as 
follows: 
"Every person who attempts to commit an offense, and in 
such attempt does any act towa·rds its cotn1nission, shall, when 
not otherwise provided, be punished as follows: If the of-
fense attempted be punishable ~vith death, the person making 
such attempt shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than 
one nor mo·re than ten years except that attempts to commit 
rape shall be punishable 'vith death, or in the discretion of 
the jury, or the court trying the case without a jury by con-
finement in the penitentiary for life or for any term not less 
than three years; if the offense attempted be a non capital 
felony, he shall be confined in the penite·ntiary not less than 
one nor more than five years, or in the. discretion of the jury 
or the judge trying the case, by confinement in :f'ail not to 
exceed twelve months, if it be punishable by confinement in 
jail or fine, he shall be confined in not exceeding six months · 
or fined not exceeding one hundred dollars; b1tt if the attempt 
I 
I 
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be to con~mit grand or petit larceny, he shall be fined or ini-
prisoned in jail, in the discretion of the j~try, or of the court 
trying the case without a ju~ry, not less than fifteen days nor 
more than six months.'' . 
frhe verdict of the jury, being guilty, and fixing the punish-
ment at a term of eight years in the penitentiary, shows con-
clusively that the defendant was found guilty of attempting 
murder in the first degree. 
Murder in the first degree is defined by statute, Va. Code 
Section 4393, as follows: "1\.furder by poison, lying in wait, 
imprisonment, starving, or by any wilful, deliberate, and pre-
meditated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt to com• 
mit arson, rape, robbery, or burg·lary, is murder of the first 
degree. All other murder is murder of the second degree.'' ~ 
Certainly we may elin1inate from consideration here all 
of these definitions except ''"any wil/1.1.l, deliberate and pre-
meditated killing." The indictment does not charge an at-
tempt to commit murder in the first degree, nor does it charge 
intent to commit murder. A feeble attempt appears to have 
been n1ade in the bill of particulars to supply this omission 
by stating therein, as above set forth in the second assign-
ment of error, that the intent was to a.ttem,pt to commit mur-
der. 
Admitting for the sake of argument that the indictment, 
when read with the bill of particulars, is a good and sufficient 
indictment for an attempt to commit murder, we are still con-
fronted with a total lack of evidence to support a verdict of 
attempt to commit murder in the first degree. 
The witnesses for the Cmnn1on,vealth are five in number, 
all working on the dredge in James River and friends who met 
at the beer saloon on Sunday night, l\{arch 25, 1934. P. H. 
Trull, the prosecuting witness testifies that he recognized the 
defendant at the beer saloon, but they were not acquaintances. 
(R., p. 25.) That as he (the witness) passed out of the door-
way of the saloon across a narrow porch that, he thinking· 
his friend, I{uzbar, another witness for the Commonwealth, 
was drunk, told Kuzbar to come on and go home before the 
law came and locked him up; that .... the defendant, Merritt, then 
asked the witness what he had to do with this and he replied 
that he had nothing to do with it. Whereupon the defendant 
struck at Trull, the "ritness, but failed to land the blow, and 
witness, Trull, retaliated by knocking the defendant down, and 
as the witness took two steps towards the defendant who was 
lying on the ground, the defendant drew a pistol from his. 
pocket and fired once at the head of the witness, the bullet 
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passing through the brim of his hat. Witness immediately 
ran away, returning later to 'regain his hat, which he says 
he lost in his. flight. (R., pp. 25-26.) 
John l{uzbar,. the witness who had the· ''argument'' with 
one ''Funny'' lVIoore, which caused the ejection from thP 
saloon of the whole crowd, testifies that he saw Trull ana 
the defendant, Merritt, on the sidewalk when he eme'rged from 
the saloon, and that there were a considerable number of per-
sons in the throng on the sidewalk.. This witness saw Trull 
knock the defendant down. He also saw the flash of the pis-
tol shot and heard the report. He saw ''Trull fall down, get 
up and run away". The witness himself tried to take the 
pistol away from the defendant while he· was still lying on 
the ground and was struck on the head ·with the pistol by 
Merritt, the defendant. There were three other witnesses for 
the Commonwealth, to-wit: Bruce Estes, Ralph Merrick and 
Cecil Joyce. None of these witnesses corroborate Trull or each 
other, except that there had been no quarrel between Trull 
and the defendant, and that Trull knocked the defendant do·wn 
and was standing over him when the pistol was fired. 
The evidence of the witness, Trull, is contradicted by the· 
circumstances and the physical facts shown to exist in the 
case. He testifies he lost his hat when he ran away, but re-
gairied it after returning- fron1 the police station. Mrs. Galla-
ger, proprietress, of the saloon, in her testimony, which is 
not only uncontradicted by the Commonwealth's witnesses, 
but is corroborated in almost every detail, says she· ordered 
the ''whole assemblage- out of the building and fastened the 
door.'' She called the police and afterwards admitted the 
witness, Trull, who came back for his hat and found it in the 
saloon. If Trull actually had the hat on and lost it in his 
flight after the pistol shot, as he says, one naturally wonders 
how it came to be in the saloon which had been fastened up 
since the crowd was ordered out when the difficulty or '' ar-
gument'' started· between Kuzbar and ''Funny'' ·Moore. 
Certainly, "Te can not presume as a matter of law, and in . ! 
the absence of any evidence of intent to commit n1urder in 
the first degree, that the defendant intended anything other 
than the natural consequences of his own act. Quoting the 
language of the court in Thacker v. Con~., 134 Va. at page 
769: . 
'' (1) An attempt to connnit a crime is composed of two ele-
;ments: (1) The intent to con1mit it: and (2) a direct in-
effectual act done towards its commission. The act must reach 
far enough towards the accomplishment of the desired result 
to amount to the commencen1ent. of the consummation. Hicks 
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v. ·Cont., 86 Va. 226, 9 S. E. 1024, 19 Am. St. Rep. 891; Uhl 's· 
Case, 6 Gratt. ( 47 V a.) 7.06. ' 
"(2) The law can presume the intention so far as realized 
in the act, but not an intention beyond what was so realized. 
IThe law does not presume, because an assault was made with 
a weapon likely to produce death, that it was an assault with 
the intent to murd~r. And "rhere it takes a particular intent 
to constitute a crime that particular intent must be proved 
either by direct or circumstantial evidence, which would war-
rant the inference of the intent with which the act was done. 
"(3) When a statute n1akes an offense to consist of an 
act combined with a particular intent, that intent is just as 
necessary to be proved as the act itself, and must be found; 
as a matter of fact before a conviction can be had; and no,1 
intent in law or mere legal presumption, differing from the 
intent in fact, can be allowed to supply the place of the latter. 
Roberts v. People, 19 Mich. 401; Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 
212, 81 Am. Dec. 781; 1 Whart. Crim. Law, sec. 316; Van-
denno.rk v. State, 47 Ill. 122; Callahan v. State, 21 Ohio St. 
306; K·unkle v. State, 32 Ind. 320; State v. Meadows, 18 W.Va. 
658; 3 Bish. New Crim. Proced., p. 1290; Kinnebrew v. State,, 
80 Ga. 232, 5 S. E. 56; Lacefield v. State, 34 Ark. 275, 36 Am·. 
Rep. 8. 
"(4) In discussing the la'v of attempts, Mr. Clark, in his 
work on crin1inal law, says, at page 111: ''The act must be 
done with the specific intent to commit a particular crime. 
This specific intent at the time the act is done is essential. 
To do an act from general malevolence is not an attempt to 
commit a crime, because there is no specific intent, though 
the act according to its consequences n1ay amount to a sub-
stantive crime. To do an act 'vith intent to commit one crime 
cannot be an attempt to commit another crime though it 
mig·ht result in such other crime. To set fire to a house and 
burn a human being who is in it, but not to the offender's. 
knowledge, would be n1urder, though the intent 'vas to burn 
the house only; but to attempt ~o set fire to the house under 
such circun1stances would be an attempt to commit arson 
only and not an attempt to murder. A man actuated by gen-, 
eral malevolence may con1n1it murder though there is no ac-
tual intention to kill; to be g·uilty of an ~ttempt to Inurder· 
there must be a specific intent to kill.'' 
Mr. Bishop, in his Criminal Law, Vol. 1 (8th ed.), at sec-
tion 729, says: ''When the law makes an act, whether more. 
or less evil in itself,. punishable, though done simply from 
general malevolence, if one takes what, were all accomplished, 
would be a step towards it, yet if he does not mean to do the · 
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whole, no court can justly hold hiin answerable for more than 
he does. And when the thing done does not constitute a sub-
stantive crime, there is no ground foi· treating it as an attempt . 
.So that necessarily an act pr01npted by general malevolence, 
or by a specific design to do son1ething else, is not an attempt 
to commit a crime not intended * * • 
· vVhen· we say that a man attempted to do a given wrong, 
we mean that he intended to do, specifically, it; and proceeded 
a certain way in the doing·. The intent in the mind covers the 
thing in full ; the act covers it only in part. Thus (section 
?30} to commit murder, one need not intend to take life, but 
to be guilty of an attentpt to n1urder, he must so intend. It 
is not sufficient that his act, had it proved fatal, would have 
been murder (section 736). vVe have seen that the unintended 
taking of life may be nnuder, yet there can be no attempt to 
murder without the specific intent to commit it-a rule the 
latter branch whereof appears probably in a few of the States 
to have been interfered with by statutes (citing Texas cases). 
For example, if one from a housetop recklessly throws down 
a billet of wood upon the sidewalk where persons are con-
stantly passing, and it falls upon a person passing by and 
kills him, this would be the c01nmon law murder, but if, in-
stead of killing, it inflicts only a slight injury, the party could 
not be convicted of an assault with attmnpt to commit mur-
der, since, in fact, the 1nurder was not intended." 
See also Hicks v. Co·m., 86 Va. 226; Andrews v. Con~., 135 
Va. 451; Lee v. Co·m., 144 Va. 594. 
The defendant shot only once, and then notwithstanding 
the fact that, according to the Commonwealth's evidence, 4e 
was 'vithin a fe'v feet of the witness, and lying on the ground 
'vith his assailant, the witness Trull, standing over him, he 
did not shoot a second time and stopped shooting as soon as 
Trull ran away fron1. him. According to Trull's testimony 
he was advancing· upon the defendant after having knocked 
him down. Trull was a very much larger man than the de-
fendant, and the defendant was at that time suffering from 
the effects of injuries received in an automobile accident and 
had only stopped using his crutches a few days before the 
assault. The whole evidence of the Commonwealth shows 
conclusively that the defendant shot only to scare away his 
assailant and ceased shooting as soon as Trull desisted in the 
assault. 
To presume, as the trial judge does in his opinion (R., p. 
17) that the defendant intended to kill ~rull or even to shoot 
hin1 is presuming the existence of an intent that is in no 
way supported by the evidence. Notwithstanding the fact 
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that the jury appears to have misconstrued the law of the 
case and misapplied the facts as testified to by the Common-
wealth witnesses, the jury still did not find the defendant 
guilty of attempted murder in the first degree ; but found him 
guilty of ''shooting with intent to kill''. The trial court of et 
its own volition amended and rewrote the verdict to say 
"guilty of shooting at P. H. Trull with intent to kill and 
murder him, the said P. H. Trull".· (R., p. 17.) The defend-
ant, by coun~el, then and there moved to set the verdict aside 
as being contrary to the law and evidence in the case and with-
out evidence to support it. lThis motion 'vas continued and 
argued later during the term as is shown by the record and 
one of the errors assigned at the bar of the court was the 
fact that the trial court erred in changing in substance the 
verdict of the jury. It is claimed in the opinion of the trial 
judge that the changing of the verdict of the jury was not ob~ 
jected to at the time. Your petitioner respectfully submits 
that the objection was made as soon as the change in the ver-
dict became known to him. The judge himself took the in-
dictment after the verdict returned by the jury had been read 
in open court by the Clerk and rewrote the verdict in the 
language recorded. Then instructed the jury, as is usual in 
such cases, to hearken to the verdict as recorded. 
The objection was argued at length and urged at the bar 
of the court as one of the reasons for setting the verdict aside 
and granting a new trial. This was done certainly in time to 
call the trial court's attention to the error before the defend-
ant had been sentenced and in time to allow the court to cor-
rect such error by setting the verdict aside and awarding a 
new trial. . 
The law is. so well settled in regard to changing the verdict 
of the jury in both form, and substance, that your petitioner 
deems it unnecessary to go into any lengthy discussion of the 
authorities. Certainly there was a material alteration in the 
very substance and meaning of the verdict, and surely the 
defendant will not be debarred from urging it as reversible 
error because he failed to attempt to stop an act of the trial 
court that neither he nor his counsel knew of until the verdict 
as rewritten by the trial judge had been read to the jury and 
it told to hearken to the same as recorded. 
Sledd v. Cont. (19 Gratt.), 60 Va. 813; Porterfield v. Co1n., 
91 Va. 801; ·Carr v. Cont., 134 Va. 659; Atkinson v. Neblett, 
144 Va. 220; Shiflett v. Cont., 151 Va. 556. 
The instruction of the court is conceded to be erroneous. 
This instruction was not objected to when given for the rea-
sons set forth in the opinion of the trial judge. ~he verdict 
of the jury as returned in court by the foreman does not find 
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the defendant guilty of attempting to commit murder, but 
only of shooting with intent to kill. But in view of the fact 
that the verdict is without evidence to support it, and the 
jury appears to have misconstrued the law and misapplied 
o the facts, resulting in a grave 1niscarriage of justice and re-
sultant hardship and injustice to the defendant then the trial 
court should have considered the error of the instruction and 
set the verdict aside. 
WH•EREFORE, and for the reasons above given, your pe-
titioner prays for a writ of error and supersedeas to the above 
mentioned judgment of the Circuit Court of the City of Hope-
well, and that the same be reviewed and reversed, and a new 
trial be a'varded your petitioner in accordance with the jus-
tice of his case. 
Your petitioner hereby adopts this petition as his brief, 
and certifies that a copy hereof was delivered in person to 
John P. Goodman, Commonwealth Attorney for the City of 
Hopewell on the lOth day of October, 19·34. 
LEWIS ~IERRITT. 
By Counsel. 
J. TOOMER GARROW. 
Attorney for Petitioner. 
We, Archer L. Jones and J. Toomer Garrow, attorneys 
practicing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do 
hereby state that we are of opinion that there are errors in 
the said record .in this case, and that the judgment should be 
reviewed and set aside. ' 
ARCHER L. JONES 
J. TOO~IER GARROW 
Received Oct. 26, 1934. 
~I. B. W AT.TS, Clerb.. 
Nov. 21, 1934. Writ of Error and sup. awarded by the 
Court. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell: 
Record in the case of Commonwealth of Virginia against 
Lewis Merrit, convicted of a felony, to-wit: Attempt to kill 
and murqer one P. H. Trull. 
INDICTlVIENT. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell: 
City of Hopewell, to-wit: 
The Grand Jurors of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in and 
for the body of the City of Hopewell, and now attending the 
Circuit Court of the said city at its April Term, 1934, upon 
their oaths present that, LE,VIS ~1:ERRITT did, on the 25th 
day of March, 1934, in the said City of Hopewell, feloniously 
attempt to commit the crime of murder by then and there with 
a pistol, then and there charged and loaded with gunpowder 
and leaden bullets, which said pistol, he, the said LEWIS 
MERRITT in his hand then and there held, then and there 
feloniously, willfully and of his malice aforethought, did point 
at and towards one, P. H. TRULL, he, the said LEWIS MER-
RITT, at this time being close enough to the said P. H. 
TRULL, to be within carrying distance of said pistol, and so 
the jurors of the Commonwealth of Virginia, upon their oaths 
do say that LEWI-S MERRIT:T, then and there, in the man-
ner and form above set forth, did attempt to kill and murder 
the said P. T. TRULL, against the peace and dignity of the 
Com1nonwealth of Virginia. 
page 2} (signed) JOHN P. GOODMAN, 
Commonwealth Attorney. 
Witnesses sworn and sent before the grand jury, John 
Kuzbar, Brllce Estes, Cecil Joyce, Ralph Merrick, P. H. Trull. 
I4 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
And indorsed on the back of the said indictment are the 





Common,vealth of Virginia 
v. Atternpt to Kill 
Lewis Merritt. 
A True Bill. 
JOHN J. COOl{, 
Foreman. 
Indictment returned in 
open Court April 10, 1934. 
G. C. A.L.DERSON, Clerk. 
BILL OF PARTICULARS. 
(1) The Commonwealth expects to show by evidence that 
Louis Merritt did on the 25th day of March, 1934, have in hi~ 
possession a pistol, and ; 
(2) 'That the said Lewis ~ierritt did discharge and shoot 
off the said pistol against, and at the said P. H. Trull, with 
intent to attempt to com.mitt murder. 
(3) 
page 3 ~ 
Virginia: 
(signed) JOHN P. GOODMAN, 
Atty. for Commonwealth. 
Filed: M. R. P. Apr. 13, 1934. 
COURT ORDER APRTL 13, 1934. 
Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, on Friday the 13th 
day of April, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and 
thirty-four. ' 
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Upon an Indictment for Felony; Attempt to !{ill and 1\{urder. 
This day can1e the Attorney for the Commonwealth, and 
Lewis 1\{erritt, who stands indicted of a felony, to-wit: At-
tempt to kill and murder one P. H. Trull, appeared in court 
in obedience to the terms of his recognizance heretofore duly 
entered into; and was set to the bar in the custody of the 
Sergeant; Thereupon the defendant, Lewis Merritt, by hi~ 
attorney, demurred to the indictment in this case, on the 
ground that the said indictment is not sufficient in law, in re-
spect of the terms in 'vhich it purports to charge an attempt 
to commit murder; which demurrer is overruled, and the de-
fendant, by his attorney, excepted. Thereupon the defendant, 
by his attorney, moved the court to require the Attorney for 
the Con1n1onwealth to furnish hirn with a bill of particulars; 
'vhich n10tion is g-ranted, and the Attorney for the Common-
we.a1th was thereupon required forthwith to furnish the de-
fer ... dant with a bill of particulars of the offence charged. 
Thereupon the defendant, by his attorney, n1oved the court 
to reject the said bill of particulars; which motion the court 
doth overrule; and the defendant, by his attorney, 
page 4 ~ again excepted. 1Thereupon, on being arraigned 
of the felony aforesaid, the defendant, Lewis Mer~ 
ritt, pleaded ''Not Guilty'' to the charge contained in the in-
dictment. And thereupon of the persons appearing in Court 
in obedience to the summons of the City .Sergeant, in pur-
suance of the orig·inal, alias, and plurie.~ writs of venire facias,· 
heretofore duly issued and executed in order to the trial of 
cases of felony at this term, a panel of twenty persons, free 
from exceptions, and qualified in all respects to serve as jurors. 
is constituted, from which panel the Attorney for the Com-· 
moln\7{'alth, and the accused, by his attorney, having each al-
ternate]y stricken four persons, the Attorney for the Com-
nlonweaHll beginning, the remaining twelve composed the 
jury for the trial of this case, to-wit: Fred :8. Mede, J. J. 
Strickland, Otto Parker, W. J. Brewer, Chas. Peeples, Britt 
Sheally, E. T. Jolly, T. B. Greer, B. 1{. Jones, J. W. Brindle, 
Frank H. Van Benthuysen, and Fred J{elly, who having been 
thereupon duly s"Torn the truth of, and upon, the prem-
ises to speak, and having received their charge, and having 
thereupon partially heard the testimony introduced on behalf 
of the Commonwealth, and o~ the accused, were at 6:15 ,p. M. 
adjourned until tomorro'v morning at 9:30 o'clock, A. M. 
And further proceedings in this case are continued until to-
morrow n1orning at 9 :30 A. ~L 
(signed) 1\f. R. PETERSON, Judge. 
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page 5 ~ COURT ORDER APRIL 14, 1934. 
Virginia: 
Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, on Saturday the 14th 
day of April, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and 
thirty-four. 
Commonwealth of ·virginia, 
v. 
Lewis Merritt. 
Upon an Indictment for Felony; Attempt to Kill and Murder. 
This day came again the Attorney for the Commonwealth 
and Le,vis Merritt, who stands indicted of a felony, to-wit: 
attempt to kill and murder one P. H. Trull, again appeared 
in court in proper person in accordance with the terms of his 
recognizance, heretofore entered into, and was set to the bar 
in the custody of the Sergeant. And thereupon the jury, sworn 
in this case on yesterday, again appeared in Court, pursuant 
to their adjournment on yesterday, and thereupon having 
fully heard the testimony introduced on behalf of the Com-
monwealth, and of the accused, the instructions of the court, 
and the argument of counsel, retired to their roon1 to consider 
of their verdict, and after some time returned into the court 
and reported a ve-rdict in the following words and figures, 
to-wit: "We, the jury, find the defendant, Lewis Merritt, 
guilty of shooting at P. H. Trull with intent to kill and mur-
der him, the said P. H. Trull, as charged in the within indict-
ment, and ascertain his punishment to be confinement in the 
State Penitentiary for the term of Eight {8) years, (signed) 
Frank H. Van Benthuysen, Foreman.'' And thereupon the 
defendant, by his attorney, moved the Court to set 
page 6 ~ aside the verdict of the jury and grant him a. new 
trial on the ground that the said verdict is contrary 
. to the law and the evidence, and without evidence to support 
it; the hearing and disposition of which said motion the Court 
doth continue until April 20, 1934, at 10 :00 A. ~L 
And the prisoner is comn1i tted to jail. 
(signed) }tL R. PE!TERSON, Judge. 
Lewis Merritt v. Common,vealth of Virginia. l'i 
COUR;T ORDER APRIL 20, 1934. 
Virginia: 
Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, on Friday the 20th 
day of April, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and 
thirty-four. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
1). 
Lewis Merritt. 
Upon an Indictment for Felony; Attempt to Kill and Murder~' 
This day came the Attorney for the Commonwealth, and 
Lewis J\tierritt, who stands indicted of a felony, to-wit: At-
tempt to kill and murder one P. H. Trull, was led to the ba,r 
ln. the custody of the Sergeant of this City. Thereupon, on 
motion of the defendant, by his attorney, it is ordered that 
this case be continued until Friday, May 4th, 1934, at 10 o'clock 
A. 1\1:., for the hearing and disposition of the motion by the 
defendant, heretofore made on April 14th, 1934, to set aside 
the verdict of the jury and grant him a new tria~ 
page 7 ~ on the gTounds that the said verdict is contrary to 
the law and the evidence, and without evidence, to 
support it. 
And the prisoner is remanded to jail. 
(signed) J\ti. R. PETERSON, Judge. 
COURT OR.DER l\tiAY 4, 1934. 
Virginia: 
Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, on Friday the 4th 
day of 1\{ay, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and 
thirty-four. 
Commonwealth of Virg·inin, 
v. 
Lewis Merritt. 
Upon an Indictment for Felony; Attempt to Kill and Murder. 
This day came again the Attorney for the Con1monwealth; 
and Le,vis Merritt, who stands convict of a felony, to-wit: 
Attempt to kill and murder one P. H. Trull, by the verdict 
of the jury returned in tl1is case on the 14th day of April, 
19'34, was again led to the bar in the custody of the Sergeant 
18 Supreme Court of .Appeals of Virginia. 
of this City. And, thereupon, renewed the motion, hereto-
fore made herein by the accused on the said 14th day of April, 
1934, to set aside the said verdict of the jury and grant him 
a new trial on the ground that the said verdict is improper 
in respect of the terms in which it was finally received by 
the Court, and is contrary to the law and the evidence, and 
'vithout evidence to support it; and on the further 
page 8 ~ ground of misdir.ection of the jury 'by the Court ; 
which motion having been argued, the Court, not 
being advised of its judgment in the premises, and desiring 
time to consider thereof, doth, with the consent of the At-
torney for the Commonwealth, and of the accused, by his 
Attorney, continue until some future and convenient day at 
this, the April term, 1934, of this Court: 
And the prisoner is remanded to jail. 
(signed) M. R. PETERSON, Judge. 
COUR(r. ORDER MAY 23, 1934. 
Virginia: 
Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, on Wednesday the 
23rd day of May, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred 
and thirty-four. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
v. 
Lewis Merritt. 
Upon an Indictment for Felony; Attempt to Kill and Murder. 
This day came again the Attorney for the Commonwealth; 
and Lewis l\{erritt, who stands convict of a felony, to-wit: 
Attempt to kill and murder one P. H. Trull, by the verdict 
of the jury returned in this case on the 14th day of April, 
1934, at this the April term, 1934, of this court, was again 
led to the bar in the custody of the Sergeant of this City: 
And thereupon the court, having maturely considered of 
its judgment up~n the motion of the defendant, heretofore 
made by him on the 14th day of April, 1934; and 
page 9 ~ thereupon continued until the 20th day of April, 
1934; and thereupon continued until the 4th day of 
May, 1934; and thereupon hitherto continued, as appears by 
the recitals of the orders heretofore entered herein on the 
said respective days, and being of opinion, for reasons. set 
forth in a memorandum of opinion this day hereby filed and 
n:tade a part of the record in this case, that the defendant's 
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motion for a new trial should be denied, doth overrule the said 
motion; to which action of the court in overruling said mo-
tion, the defendant, by his attorney, excepted; 
-Whereupon, it being demanded of the prisoner, Lewis. 
Merritt, if anything he knew or had to say why the Court: 
should not proceed to pronounce judgment against him ac-: 
cording· to law, and nothing being offered, or alleged in delay 
thereof, it is considered by the Court that the said Lewis 
Merritt be confined in the penitentiary of this Commonwealth 
for the term of Eight (8) years, the period of his imprison-
ment as by the jurors in their verdict ascertained, and that 
the Commonwealth of Virginia recover of the defendant, . 
Lewis Merritt, its costs by it in this behalf expended. .And, 
it is further ordered that credit be allowed the said Lewis 
Merritt for the time spent in jail awaiting trial, to-wit~ Since 
1\Iarch 25th, 1934. 
And it is further ordered that, as soon as possible after 
the entry of this order, the said Lewis Merritt be removed 
and safely conveyed, according to law, from the jail of this 
Court to the said Penitentiary, therein to be kept, 
page 10 ~ confined, and treated in the manner directed by 
law; And the said Lewis ·~ferritt is remanded to 
jail. 
And, thereupon, it being signified to the Court by the· 
defendant, by his attorney, that he desires to present to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia a petition for a writ 
or error and s·upersedeas to the judgment of the Court, here-
inabove pronounced as aforesaid, it is ordered, on motion of 
the defendant, by his atttorney, that execution thereof be 
postponed for a period of sixty-five (65) days next upon the 
date of this order ensuing. 
(signed) M. R. PETERSON, Judge. 
page 11 ~ OPINION OF THE COURT. 
Virginia: 




: Upon Indictment for an Attempt to Commit Murder 
To present the elements of the case at bar, it is sufficient 
20 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
to recapitulate the testimony for the Common,vealth, with a 
brief recital of the essential circumstances. 
The evidence- shows, according to the Commonwealth's 
witnesses, that the defendant and several acquaintances or 
friends, and the prosecuting witness, Trull, and one or two 
friends, were in a beer saloon in the City of Hopewell on the 
occasion on which the crime is charged to have occurred. 
This· testimony is to the effect that there was some '' argu-
ment", indefinite in its character, so far .as the testimony 
indicates, for no witness on the part of the Commonwealth, 
nor on the part of the defendant purports to indicate clearly 
what the discussion or controversy was about. At all events 
the witness, Trull, and other witnesses of the Commonwealth 
state that the "argument" beca1ne so high as to result in the 
exclusion of the parties indiscriminately fron1 the premises 
by the ·own~r of the resort, which was know as the "Blue 
Moon", and was conducted by Mrs. Galliher. As the Wit-
ness, Trull, emerged into the street, so he testified, the de-
fendant, 1\ierritt, struck at him with his fist, but 
page 12 ~ missed him; 'vhereupon, Trull, in his turn, re-
sponded in like n1anner by knocking the defendant 
down. Trull further testified that, as the defendant lay on 
the ground, he drew a pistol from his pocket and fired at 
the 'vitness, who stood over hin1. The bullet discharged from 
the defendant's pistol passed through the brim of Trull's 
hat. Startled and frightened by the shot, Trull and a com-
panion hurried to the police station and reported the occur-
r-ence, but were advised that the officers were already en ro~f;te 
to the scene in response to some prior notification of the inci-
dent. The defendant, Merritt, was arrested and indicted 
for an attempt to commit murder. He was found guilty by 
the jury and sentenced to the State Penitentiary for the term 
of eight (8) years. 
The first question in the case arises upon the defendant's 
demurrer to the indictn1ent. The ground of this demurrer 
was that the indictment failed to charge the commission by 
the defendant of such overt act as would justify the prosecu-
tion. The indictment stated, without attempting to quote it in 
its entirety, that the defendant attempted to kill and murder 
the witness Trull, and averred as the ove·rt act the act of the 
defendant in maliciously pointing a loaded pistol at him. 
The indictment, in other 'vords, did not allege that the pistol. 
was actually fired. ;The demurrer was overruled. The · de-
fendant then moved the Court to require of the plaintiff a · 
Bill of Particulars of the offense. This motion was granted, 
and a Bill of Particulars was filed in which it was stated 
that the Commonwealth intended to sho'v that the pistol was 
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discharged at the witness Trull by the defendant with the 
- eonsequences related. This was the specific de-
page 13 }- tail which was added to the general charge of the 
crime alleged in the indictment. · 
The general doctrine pertaining to the essential elements 
of an attempt to commit crime, or the charge of an attempt 
to commit crime, is well-settled. The only question arises 
as to the application of this doctrine to the circumstances of 
a particular case. The latest expression of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals on the subject is found in Dixon v. Com-
monwealth, 173 S. E. 521, and contains a very clear resume 
of the cases in Virginia. ~The opinion is by Mr. Justice Holt. 
It reiterates the doctrine in these terms: 
''An att2mpt to commit a crime is composed of two ele-
ments: (1) The· intent to commit it; and C2) A direct in-
effectual act done towards its commission. The act must 
reach far enough towards the accomplishment of. the desired 
result to amount to the commencement of the consummation.'' 
Thacker v. 'Common'lvealth, 134 Virginia 767, 114 S. E. 504, 
505. 
In the case, Dixon v. Commonwealth, it appeared that the 
officers pursued two automobiles, suspecting the· operators 
to be engaged in the illicit trafficking in ardent spirits, and 
surprised them, or overtook them in a by-road, where the 
drivers of the two cars were standing, and one of them, 
Turner, was in the act of handing out of his car to the other, 
the accused, Dixon, a bag containing a jug of whiskey. The 
defendant, Dixon, was found guilty of transportation. The 
conviction on this score was disapproved by the Court o~ 
Appeals, as was the theory that, it not guilty of the act of 
transportation, the accused 'vas guilty of an attempt to trans-
port. The judgment of the trial court was re-
page 14 ~ versed. The opinion cites Lynch v. Commonweal.th, 
131 Virginia 769; quoting from Wharton's Crimi-
nal Law, Paragraph 181, as follows: 
''To make the act an indictable attempt, it must be a cause 
as distinguished fron1 a condition. And it must go so far 
that it must result in the crim.e unless frustrated by ex-
traneous circumstances.'' P. 523. 
No subtlety of disquisition is required to distinguish the 
the circumstances of Dixon's case from the circumstances of 
the case at bar, manifestly, no hard and fast rule can be laid 
down binding· in every case. The question as arising in any 
--~ ..... 
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case is one of mixed law and fact in which the factual element 
i~ the predominant element since it must be of such charac-
ter as to amount to a positive, determinate, definite, con-
spicious act, to be recognized as the technical overt 'act. It 
must be an ineffectual act, for if effectual the crime would 
be consummated. It must be an act in the train of causation 
of the ultimate, conte~nplated crime. It.must be the "com-
mencement of the consummation.'' The overt act, in this 
view of the matter, bears its proper analogy to the proximate 
cause in the civil law. The act in judgment here is the level-
ing at it'3 object with n1alicious purpose· of a loaded pistol, 
this the indictment assumes to be the overt act in the attempt 
to kill and murder. 
In Ruling Case Law, Volume 8, Paragraph 297, Page 279, 
it is said: 
''In order to constitute an atten1pt, it is essential that the 
defendant, with the intent of committing the particular crime, 
should have done son1e overt act adapted to, approximating, 
and which in the ordinary and likely course of things would 
result in the commission thereof. Therefore, the 
page 15 r act must reach far enough towards the accomplish-
ment of the desired result to amount to the com-
mencement of the consummation. It must not be merely 
preparatory. In other words, while it need not be the last 
proximate act to the consummation of the offense attempted 
to be perpetrated, it must approach sufficiently near it to 
stand either as the first, or some subsequent, step in a direct 
movement towards the commission of the offense as the 
preparations are made. Whenever the design of a person 
to commit a crime is clearly shown, slight acts done in fur-
therance of that design will constitute an attempt, and the 
Courts should not destroy the practical and common sense 
administration of the law with subtleties as to what consti-
tutes preparation, and what an act done towards the com-
mission of a crime. It would be usless to attempt to lay down 
any rule by which an act might be characterized as overt or 
otherwise in a. particular case, and the general policy of the 
law concerning· attempts must be applied in each case as 
nearly as can be with a view to working substantial justice. 
Several cases wherein certain acts have been held to be, or not 
to be, overt acts, will be found in the notes.'' 
The editor has collected in a note found in 20 A. S. R. 7 41, a 
number of cases, which, while old, are more or less instructive. 
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which it is held that the indictment must indicate the circum-
stances operating to frustrate· the commission of the intended 
crime, which was the object of the attempt. Just what the· 
nature of such extraneous circumstances should be becomes a 
question, maybe, of physical law, maybe, of error in the 
sensory faculties of the agent. The question may involve 
some psychological error in the agent which defeated his 
purpose. A steel jasket might turn the bullet from its mark. 
)This is an extraneous physical condition. A miscalculation 
of the distance of the agent from his target would on the 
other hand, be a psychological or sensory error on his part. 
· This would be an extraneous condition only in 
page 16 ~ the sense that any psychological error might be 
regarded as extraneous to the specific purpose of 
a fatal gesture in aiming· a loaded pistol at a person, which 
might haply be avoided by the intended victim or frustrated 
by a third person's intervention in striking up the arm of 
the person drawing the gun or other supervening contingency. · 
This, of course, would be a physical, extraneous circumstance, 
foreign to the calculation of the criminal agent; but, as I 
have said, no case holds that there should be an allegation of 
the circumstances operating to defeat the criminal intent 
of the accused. 
The question then recurs: Can it be said as a matter of 
law that the pointing of a pistol at a person with malicious 
purpose is too remote fron1 the perfect crime to be regarded 
as the commencement of the consummation 1 I do not think 
so. It was an overt act-a malicious act, alleged in the indict-
ment to have been performed in an attempt to commit mur-
der; and the failure to achieve this result, although the rea-
son does not appear in the indictment, entitles the accused 
to no credit, nor detracts from the sufficiency of the indict-
ment. 
While it is unquestionably true that the Bill of Particulars 
cannot supplement the deficiencies of a pleading, can only 
render a pleading specific where its terms are indefinite, 
still the final detail is disclosed by the Bill of Particulars in 
this case, that is, that the pistol 'vas actually dis-
page 17 ~ charged, and that the bullet had nearly penetrated 
the head of the prosecuting 'vitness. Such also 
is the testimony in the case. The escape of the accused from 
a prosecution of murder instead of a prosecution for attempt 
to commit murder "ras but a piece of good fortune. 
On the n1otion for new trial, it was argued that the verdict 
of the jury was improperly reformed by the Court before 
being received and recorded. The verdict in its original 
form was as follows: "We the jury find the defendant, Lewis 
-~----- ~~-
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Merritt, guilty of shooting with intent to kill and fix his 
punishment for a term of 8 years in the State Penitentiary, 
(signed) Frank H. Van Benthuysen, Foreman". · 
The verdict as reformed by the Court and received by the 
Court after the jury had been polled, and had testified that 
the verdict in_ its amended form was the verdict intended 
by them was as follows: "We, the jury, find the defendant, 
Lewis Merritt, guilty of shooting at P. H. \Trull with intent 
to kill and murder him, the said P. H. Trull, as charged in 
the within indictment, and ascertain his punishment to be 
confinement in the State Penitentiary for the term of Eight 
( 8) years, (signed) Frank H. Van Benthuysen, Foreman''. 
In this connection, it is proper to say that there was no 
objection made at the time to the act of the Court in amend-
ing and reforming the verdict, and no objection was made to 
the verdict as received by the Court in its amended form . 
. It was also argued on the n1otion for a new- trial that an 
instruction granted by the Court in terms as hereto 
page 18 ~ appended * was error, and that the jury were in-
fluenced to render its verdict of "guilty" in de-
ference to. this instruction. It may be that the jury were in-
fluenced in rendering their verdict by this instruction. It 
is the general duty of the jury to heed the instructions of the 
Court. It may be that this instruction, considered abstractly, 
might have been improper if it had assumed to lay down a 
complete statement of the la'v of homicide, particularly with 
reference to the effect of acts con1mitted on sudden provoca-
tion or in sudden heat, and particularly with reference to the 
theory of the possible legitimacy of the defendant's act on 
the ground of self-defense. These considerations were not 
presented to the Court in this case. Nothing is truer than 
·that cases are tried on the theory upon which they are pre-
sented to the Courts. This is the rationale of the rule in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of this State, prohibiting the as-
signment of any objection to the ruling of a Court in respect 
(*) :The Court instructs the jury that, if you believe from 
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that Louis Merritt 
did on the 25th day of ::March, have in his possession a pistol, 
and did discharge said pistol at P. H. Trull, with intent to 
kill the said P. H. Trull, then you must find him guilty of an 
attempt to commit murder as charged in the indictment, and 
fix his punishment as prescribed by law. 
1f. R. P. 
May 23, 1934. 
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to instructions or other,vise which was not first brought to 
the attention of the trial court, and which the trial court was 
not given an opportunity to consider in making the ruling. 
In the present instance, according to my custom, the in-
structions tendered, both on behalf of the Commonwealth and 
the a(!cusecl, were (!Onsidered seriatirn, and the respective 
parties, that is, the Attorney for the Commonwealth and the 
counsel for the accused were requested to state their objec-
tions. No objections were offered on the part of either party 
to the instructions given in this case. The apparent reason 
'vhy the attorney for the defense made no objec- · 
page 19 ~ tion to the instruction in question was that he was 
not concerned with the doctrine in mitigation of 
the crime of homicide reducing his offense to manslaughter, 
or justifying his act on the score of self-defense. His de-
fense was that the accused did not dra'v a pistol and did not 
shoot at all; that the shooting was the act of some unknown, 
anonymous stranger to the record. It , .. lould, therefore, have 
compromised his position if he had sought while making this 
contention to introduce the element of self-defense or other 
mitigating circumstances. The two contentions would have 
been incompatible and embarrassing. He could not well say 
to the jury that his client was innocent of shooting, but that 
nevertheless he shot in self-defense, or under circumstance 
of sudden passion. 
No objection having been made to the instruction, the ob-
jection no'v made to it that it fails to make allowance for the 
possible excitment or heat of the monent in palliation of 
the defendant's act comes too late. Courts are not bound 
as a matter of law to instruct juries in the absence of requests 
to that effect, nor are they bound to consider the effect of 
instructions to which no objections are made by parties at 
the time. 
In other 'vords, cases are tried on the theory upon which 
they are presented to the Oourt. Courts are required to rule 
only upon objections as they are made, 'modus et conventio 
vinmtnt legem. 
I am of opinion that there was no prejudicial error com-
mitted by the Court on the trial. The motion for a new trial 
will be overruled. 
M. R. PETERSON. 
page 20 ~ l\1:ay 23, 1934. 
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page 21 ~ COURT ORDER JULY 17TH, 1934. 
Virginia: 
Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, on Tuesday the 
17th day of July, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred 
and thirty-four. 
· Commonwealth of Virginia, 
v. 
Lewis 1\llerritt. 
Upon an Indictment for Felony; Attempt to Kill and 1\llurder. 
This day came again the Attorney for the Commonwealth; 
and Lewis .l\ferritt, who hath been heretofore duly sentenced 
to confinement in the State Penitentiary for the term of 
Eight (8) years upon his conviction of a felony, to-wit: At-
tempt to kill and murder one· P. H. Trull, by the judgment 
and sentence of this Court pronounced upon him herein on the 
23rd day of May, 1934, appeared in court in accordance with 
the terms of his recognizance heretofore entered into on the 
31st day of May, 1934; and, on the motion of the said Lewis 
Merritt, by his Attorney, he is permitted to renew his bail 
pending his application to the Supreme Court of Appeals 
for ~ writ of error to the judgment aforesaid; ;Thereupon, 
the said Lewis Merritt; with Mrs. Mattie A. 1\llerritt, his 
surety, were each duly recognized in the penalty of $1,000.00 
(cash in the sum of $1,000.00 having heretofore, on the 31st 
day of May, 1934, by the said 1\tlrs. Mattie A. Merritt de-
posited with the Clerk of this court as additional security), 
for the appearance of t}le said Lewis Merritt be-
page 22 ~ fore this court on the 13th day of September, 1934, 
at ten o'clock, A. M., to submit to the judgment of 
this court, heretofore pronounced as aforesaid on the 23rd 
day of }fay, 1934, in this case, or abide such further action 
as may be proper in the premises ; and not to depart thence 
without leave of the court; until 'vhich said 13th clay of Sep-
tember, 1934, execution of the said judgnwnt and sentence of 
this Court is further postponed. 
(signed) 1\L R. PETERSON, Judge. 
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COURT ORDER JULY 18TH, 1934. 
Virginia: 
Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, on Wednesday the 
18th day of July, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred 
and thirty-four. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. 
Lewis 1\Ierritt. 
Upon an Indictment for Felony; Attempt to Commit Murder. 
This day can1e again the attorney for the Commonwealth, 
and came also the defendant, Lewis Merritt, by his attorney, 
and, after due and legal notice to the attorney for the Com-
monwealth, tendered to the court his certain certificate of the 
evidence produced before the jury on the trial of this case on 
the 1J,.th day of April, 1934, at the April Term, 
page 23 ~ 1934, of this court, which he prays the court to 
certify in accordance with the statute in such case 
made and provided, and to make the same a part of the rec-
ord of this case ; 
WHEREUPON, the court doth this day accordingly certify 
and sign the said certificate of evidence, as provided by the 
said statute, which is hereby filed and made a part of the 
record in this case. 
(signed) 1\L R. PETERSON, Judge. 
page 24 ~ CERTIFICATE OF THE EVIDENGj!;. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court for the City of Hopewell: 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. 
Louis ::M~erritt 
Upon an Indictment for Felony-Attempt to Commit Murder 
The following evidence on behalf of the Commonwealth, 
and of the defendant, respectively, as hereinbefore denoted, 
is all evidence that was introduced on the trial of this cause. 
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P. H. Trull, a witness on behalf of the Commonwealth, tes-
tified as follows: On Sunday, ~larch 25th, 1934, about 7 :00 
or 7:30P.M., the witness accompanied by Cecil Joyce, Ralph 
1\{errick, and Raymond J ov:ce, repaired to the ''Blue 1\1:oon", 
a beer saloon, conducted .. by one, 1\irs. Galliger; witness's. 
companions were friends of l1is who were employed with him 
on a dredge, which was making some excavations in the chan-
nel of the James River in Chesterfield County; the witness 
_ was a resident of the City of Iiope,vell; that after remaining 
for a few minutes, witness and Bruce Estes left the beer 
saloon, but returned again later in the evening about 10:00 
or half-past ten o'clock. On entering the place on their sec-
ond visit, it appeared that son1e controversy or argument 
was in progress, witness had no part in the dis-
page 25 ~- cussion ; the accused, Louis Merritt, was one of a 
number of other persons who were in the beer 
saloon at the time, that witness recognized ~Ierritt, but that 
they were not acquaintances nor friends; witness was not 
aware of the subject of the controversy and had no part in 
it. The altercation became so heated and noisy that the 
proprietress turned the whole company in the place out into 
the street, the exact number of those who were thns evicted 
witness could not indicate exactly, but the company com-
prized both young men and 'vomen; the eviction of the party 
occurred a very short while after the witness's second visit 
to the place, probably about 11:00 o'clock P. M. The beer 
saloon is situated in the City of Hopewell next to the Beacon 
Moving Picture Theater ; as the witness passed out of the 
doorway across a narrow porch into the street, he was de-
tached from immediate association with any other person, 
and was not aware of any other person's presence in his im-
mediate neighborhood; that when he gained the porch John 
Kuzbar and ''Funny'' Moore 'vere engaged in an argument; 
witness thinking l(uzbar was drunk told him he had better 
come on go home before the law came, and locked him up; 
whereupon Merritt asked witness what witness had to do 
with this; witness replied he had nothing to do with it, at 
this Louis Merritt, the defendant,. struck at witness, but 
failed to land the blow; 'vitness Trull retaliated by striking 
Merritt and knocking him down with his left hand, his right 
being hurt; There had been no other 'vords between the two. 
'¥"itness knew of no occasion why Merritt should 
page 26 ~ have thus attacked; ~Ierritt lay on the ground and 
as 'vitness took two steps toward him, Merritt 
drew a pistol from his pocket and fired at the witness's head; 
the shot passed through the brim of 'vitness 's hat; witness 
was so much startled and appalled by the sudden pistol shot 
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that he ran away, passing around the building to the next 
street where Bruce Estes took him up and carried him to 
police headquarters where witness designed to report the 
shooting; on arriving at police headquarters and making his 
complaint, he was informed that officers had already been 
notified and had gone to the scene. Louis Merritt, the defend-
ant was subsequently arrested. Regaining his hat, which, 
upon his flight he had lost, witness went home. Witness com-
mitted no other hostile· act toward Merritt, neither kicked 
at him nor stamped him. 
John Kuzbar, a witness on behalf of the Commonwealth 
testified as follows : . Witness 'vas in the beer saloon, men-
tioned in the testimony of the witness, Trull, on the occasion 
referred to by the Witness, Trull. Considerable company 
were then in the beer saloon, both young· men and women. 
Some argument or discussion arose, the nature of which the 
witness could not very clearly explain. When the argument 
became more or less intense and the language high, the pro-
prietress, Mrs. Galliger, ordered the whole party out into 
the street and shut the door. As the witness emerged front 
the building through the porch into· the street he saw the de-· 
fendant, Louis Merritt, and the witness, Trull, on the side-
'valk ; a considerable number of persons were in 
page 2-7 ~ the throng on the sidewalk, who had left the beer 
saloon after having- been evicted by the proprie-
tress, witness saw ;Trull, knock the defendant down with his 
fist. He saw the flash of the pistol and heard the report and 
saw the witness, Trull, fall down, get up, and run away. Wit-
ness, himself, made an effort to take the pistol from Merritt 
and. was struck in the head with it by Merritt. The pistol 
'vas fired by Merritt while Merritt lay on the ground after 
having been knocked down by ;Trull. Trull neither kicked 
nor st01nped Merritt; Trull struck Thf.erritt but once knock-
ing him down as stated; 
Bruce Estes, a witness on behalf of the Commonwealth 
testified as follows: He was in the saloon on the occasion 
of the disturban<!'e, mentioned by the Witnesses Trull and 
l{uzbar, and went out in the throng when the place was cleared 
by the proprietress, Mrs. Galliger. An argument or con-
troversy, the nature of which the 'vitness was unable to ex-
plain arose al)out 11 :00 o'clock P. 1\L; and it was when it 
became heated that the proprietress ordered all the company 
then in the saloon to leave. The witness went out into the 
street in the throng, consisting of some fifteen or twenty per-
sons, more or fewer, young men and women. So far as th~ 
witness knew Trull had had no part in the controversy, nor 
had the defendant, Merritt, any part in it; a number of per-
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sons were participants in the argument in the saloon. All 
the persons in the saloon witness could not identify. After wit-
ness got out into the street, witness saw 1\{erritt lying on 
the g-round. As he lay on the ground the defend-
page 28 ~ ant, ~Ierritt, shot at Trull, who was standing over 
him. Witness could see that lVIerritt held the 
pistol; witness then saw Trull instantly run away; the wit-
ness got into his car and afterwards found Trull in a neighbor-
ing Street, took him in his car, and carried him to the police 
station where the witness :Trull reported the occurrence to 
the police. 
Ralph Merrick, a witness on behalf of the Cormnonwealth 
testified that he was in the saloon on the occasion of the shoot-
ing mentioned by the witness, Trull, and retired from the 
place when the company was ordered to leave by the pro-
prietress. I-Ie saw Louis lVIerritt on gaining the street strike 
at Trull with his fist. The blow 1nissed him and he saw Trull 
thereupon strike Merritt with his left hand and knock him 
down; Trull's right hand was at the time in a bandage; .Sev-
eral people were standing by. None of them took any part 
in the affray. He saw Merritt draw a pistol from the pocket 
of the lumber-jacket he wore and fire it at Trull. who stood 
over him. I-Ie also saw defendant 1\{erritt strike John l{uz-
bar with the pistol, as l{uzbar came towards him, 1\ferritt 
said he would shoot Kuzbar if Kuzbar came any further. 
This 'vas after Merritt had shot at !Trull; 
Cecil Joyce, a witness for the Commonwealth testified that 
he in company with Ralph 1\Ierrick, Witness Trull, and 
Joyce's brother went to the beer saloon mentioned in the 
testimony of Witness Trull about 7:00 or 7:30 o'clock P. M. 
on March 25th, 1934, and that shortly afterwards 
page 29 ~ the Witness Trull and Bruce Estes left the place, 
returning again about 10:00 or half past ten o'clock 
in the evening. The witness, himself, stayed in the saloon 
until they returned. During the absence of Estes and Trull, 
and argument arose among some persons present, whereupon 
at length and after Trull's return to the "Saloon, the argu-
ment still continuing the proprietress required the whole 
party to leave the place. As the throng pass_ed out into the 
street, witness sa'v Lewis 1\Ierritt standing near the curb. 
Witness saw Trull knock l\ferritt down. As Trull stood over 
};ferritt, the witness heard a pistol shot and saw Trull turn 
awav and run towards the house. Witness didn't see the 
pistol, but saw the flash and heard the report. The pistol 
was fired by Lewis lVIerritt at Trull. Officers shortly after-
wards arrived at the scene and placed witness's brother, 
John l{uzbar, and Louis Merritt under arrest. Witness did 
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not know the cause of the argument, nor could he recall any 
of_ the language used in the controversy. The pistol was. 
fired when Trull came toward Merritt; Trull neither kicked 
nor stamped Merritt. 
Arthur Atwater, a witness for the defendant testified that 
he went to the beer saloon alone about 10:00 P. M. Sunday 
night, March 25, 1934. That he found quite a crowd there,. 
and that there was dancing going on in the room back of the 
bar. lThat he knew only two or three of the men present. He 
did not know any of the men from the dredge. That he was 
acquainted with Merritt, the defendant, whom witness ac-
companied to the saloon; after witness and Merritt entered 
the saloon witness lost sight of ~Ierritt. That, 
page 30 ~ soon after 'vitness arrived at the saloon Trull 
. passed him, and jostled him with his elbow; that 
at this time, Trull had no hat on; that he, Atwater, thinking 
1Trull was drinking said to Trull : ''I beg your pardon''· 
Trull made no answer but went on his way towards .the front 
of the house. !That the room was close and witness went upon 
the front porch to get a breath of fresh air and smoke a cigar; 
witness went toward the left to the end of the porch; that 
witness after a little space turned to the right, and saw Lewis 
Merritt, the defendant, standing facing witness some twenty 
five feet distant; witne.ss saw another person facing Merritt, 
but did not recognize him at the time; this person struck· 
Merritt in the face or in the chest and knocked 1\{erritt down. 
backward on the curb of the street; as Merritt was getting· 
up on his hands and knees, witness saw a pistol fire straight 
up in the air''; witness then walked from the porch to the 
sidewalk and recognized P. H. or ''Country'' Trull as the 
man who had knocked Merritt down. Trull and Merritt were 
standing on the sidewalk when Trull knocked Merritt down; 
as Merritt 'vas g·etting up, witness saw Trull kick or stamp 
Merritt apparently in the face; then the crowd came out of 
the saloon and gathered around Trull and Merritt; when 
somebody gave the alarm that the police were coming, wit-
ness turned away, and went to the front of the Beacon 
Theatre next door where witness stood until the police came; 
the pistol seemed to have been fired according to the flash 
at about the height of a man's chest above the ground, as it 
appeared from where witness was standing. 
page 31 ~ Earl Craven, a witness on behalf of the defend-
ant testified as follows: He was one of a number 
of others in the Blue Moon Beer Saloon in the City of Hope-
well, Virginia, on Sunday night, March 25th, 1934. John . 
Kuzbar and Frank Moore, some times called ''Funny" 
Moore became engaged in an argument or controversy about 
32 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
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some matter, the nature of which he never ascertained; Mrs. 
Galliger ordered the entire party in the place to leave, which 
they proceeded to do. \The witness was among the last of the 
crowd to take his departure. Louis Merritt, the defendant, 
was standing on the sidewalk somewhat aloof of the crowd 
a fe,v feet off with his hands in the pockets of a lumber jacket, 
fitted with side pockets; Trull approached Merritt and struck 
Merritt, knocking him down and kicked at him. A consider-
able group clustered about the two and witness heard a pistol 
fired. He did not see the pistol, but heard the report, saw 
the flash. The flash of the pistol was higher than the heads 
of the men standing around Merritt and Trull. Merritt was 
on the ground. Trull immediately turned and ran away 
around the house. Witness did not see Trull again. Officers 
arrived promptly and arrested John l{uzbar, and 1\!Ierritt. 
They searched 1\!Ierritt but could find no pistol. Witness told 
the officers that he heard someone shoot, but he did not know 
who fired the pistol. 
Flay Stephen, a witness on behalf of the defendant testi-
fied as follows: He 'vas among the party that came out of 
the beer saloon, mentioned in the testimony of the 
page 32 ~ defendant's witnesses when the proprietress or-
dered the crowd to leave. He was among the last 
to leave. His attention was attracted by some commotion. 
He turned and saw the defendant, Merritt, lying on the 
ground, and the witness Trull standing over him; at that 
time he heard a pistol shot, sa'v the flash. )The flash was 
above the shoulders of the men standing around Trull and 
Merritt, who was then lying on the ground. It appeared to 
him to have been at too great an elevation to have been fired 
by a person lying· on the gTound. 
Mrs. Pat Galliger, a 'vitness for the defendant testified 
as follows: She 'vas in her kitchen in the back of the dance 
hall in the "Blue Moon'' saloon, conducted by her when she 
heard the sound of an argument among some of the persons 
in the dance ha.ll where dancing was in progress. She im-
mediately went to the scene and ordered the whole assemblage 
out of the building· and fastened the door. She then called 
the police by telephone. She heard a pistol fired, but did 
not know who discharged it. .She knew Louis Merritt, 'vho 
frequently came to her place. She had never had any trouble 
with him. She knew also P. H. Trull, sometimes called 
''Country'', who had been a frequent visitant at her saloon. 
After the officers left her place Trull came back looking for 
his hat and found it. She did not know 'vhether someone had 
brought it in from the street after the altercation, or whether 
it had been left in the saloon by Trull, himself, when he re-
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tired with the others. She did not know whether the brim 
. was punctured or not. 
page 33 ~ Louis Merritt, the defendant, a witness on his 
own behalf testified that he appeared in the saloon 
just before the argument between Kuzbar and Moore began. 
He did not know what the argument was about, but Moore 
asked him to lend him his gloves, a pair of heavy pig-skin 
gloves. He thought this was in preparation for a fight and 
that ~foore 's intention was to protect his hands-to protect 
his knuckles in a fistic encounter; Mrs. Galliger immediately 
ordered all persons in the place to leave, and he went out with 
the throng·. .As he was standing on the sidewalk near an 
automobile, parked there, with his hands in his pockets, 
watching· the crowd, Trull came up to him and struck him in 
the face without any warning or provocation; the blow 
knocked him down and Trull either kicked him or stamped 
him. While he was trying to get to his feet he heard there-
port of a pistol. iTrull immediately stopped kicking him and 
ran away. He did not know where Trull went, nor did he see 
him again. He recognized Trull when he saw .him and knew 
his name, but had never been acquainted with him. He had 
given no provocation to Trull to strike him; had not been in 
his company, except to be in the dance hall during the dances 
'vhen he was in the saloon. He did not strike Trull or any-
one else w·hen he came out of the saloon, nor when he reached 
the street. Trull was very much larger and taller than the 
defendant, 'vho had been hurt some months' before in an 
autmnobile accident, and had only ceased using crutches a 
few days' before. He did not ·have a pistol and did not shoot. 
page 34 ~ Teste, this 18th day of July, 1934. 
(signed) M. R. PE,TERSON, Judge. 
A Copy, Teste : 
G~ C. ALDERSON, men. 
page 35 ~ Virginia : 
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court for the City of 
Hope,vell: 
I. G. C. Alderson, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the City 
of Hopewell, Virginia, do certify that the foregoing is a true 
transcript of the record in the case of Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, plaintiff, against Le,vis Merrit, defendant, lately pend-
34 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
ing in the said Circuit Court of the City of Hopewell, Vir-
ginia. 
I, further certify that the said record was not made up 
and completed until notice had been. given to the attorney 
for the appellee, and that notice was given to the atton1ey for 
the appellee of the time and place at which the defendant 
would apply to the Judge for certification of the record. 
Given under my hand this 19th day of July, 1934. 
G. C. ALDERSON, Clerk. 
Fee for transcript of record: $30.00. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. W ATT.S, Clerk. 
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